and managing its affairs. Its work is primarily directed to the spiritual, moral, and physical reformation of the working classes, to the reclamation of the vicious, criminal, dissolute, and degraded; to visitation among the poor, lowly, and sick; and to the preaching of the gospel and the dissemination of Christian truth by means of open-air and indoor meetings. So it preaches the gospel. It disseminates Christian truth. It is a church, a sect, and a religious institution. It is sectarian in that it preaches the gospel of Christ, and undertakes to disseminate Christian truth, in all probability the peculiar doctrines and tenets of some branch of Protestantism, in preference to Catholicism, the doctrines of the Jewish religion, Mohammedanism, and the various other religions of the world. The fact that it undertakes to disseminate Christian truth, which many people believe to be the highest and holiest form of religion, does not render it unsectarian. The fact that the Salvation Army undertakes to reform the working classes, to reclaim the vicious, criminal, dissolute, and degraded, to visit the poor, lowly, and sick, which is 'pure religion and undefiled before God,' and the highest form of benevolence, does not free it from being a sectarian institution. Being such, no money can be taken directly or indirectly from the public treasury to aid it in these benevolent objects and purposes."

Suffrage Amendment to the Constitution Does Not Give Women the Right to Serve on Grand Jury.—In Harper *v.* State, 234 S. W. 909, the court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that amendments to the state and federal constitutions giving women the right to vote, do not give them the right to serve as members of the grand jury.

The court said in part:

"Both the amendment to the state and federal constitutions were adopted, and were in effect when the grand jury in question was organized. The amendments themselves, as well as the resolution in connection therewith, show that the only subject in contemplation was the right of suffrage. No attempt to enlarge any restrictions with reference to jury service was embraced. If our Constitution and laws (which is the case in some states) made all qualified voters eligible for jury duty, the question would not even be debatable. But such is not the case. It is true all jurors are required to be qualified voters, but it does not follow by any means that all qualified voters are eligible as grand jurors. An unmarried man, though a voter, and in every other way desirable as a juror, if he chances not to be a householder or freeholder, is denied the privilege (if it be so considered) of being a juror. Many other qualified voters are not permitted to serve on juries.

"The qualification of jurors, as prescribed in the many states, vary so considerably, and because of the recent date of the amendment in question, it is difficult to find precedent; but the exact question under

consideration was passed upon by the New York courts in the case of Ex parte Julia Grilli, decided January 6, 1920, 110 Misc. Rep. 45, 179 N. Y. Supp. 795. The law as it related to Kings county, N. Y., required the assessors, between certain dates each year, to return to the commissioner of jurors a written list containing the names of all persons who were liable to serve as trial jurors. The relator filed an application for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the board of assessors and the commissioner of jurors to complete the jury list of Kings county by including therein each and every woman in the county qualified and liable for jury duty. The first qualification for a juror under sec. 686 of the Judiciary Law of that state (Consol. Laws, c. 30) is: '(1) A male citizen of the United States, and a resident of that county.' What was said by the court is so appropriate to the provisions of our own statute with reference to the exclusion of certain voters as jurors that we quote from the opinion as follows:

'The only claim made by the petition in connection with her application is that jury service is incidental to and a part of suffrage, and since by the recent amendment of the state Constitution, women are qualified to vote, they must be made jurors. The fallacy of this contention is found in an examination of the history of the jury system since the adoption of the first Constitution in the state of New York. While citizenship has always been a qualification of jury service, every voter has not been included within the jury lists. The various laws with reference to jurors show that men who were entitled to vote have been excluded from jury service. By sec. 686, above mentioned, male citizens over the age 70 and male citizens who do not own real property of $150 or personal property of $250, and male citizens who are infirm or decrepit, male citizens who are not intelligent, and male citizens who are not of good character, and male citizens who are not able to read and write the English language understandingly, are disqualified from jury service. Similar statutes are made applicable to other counties. These limitations include a large number of citizens who vote. Similar enactments had existed in this state for many years, clearly showing that the right to vote did not of itself carry with it the right of jury service.'

"The opinion further quotes from Strauder *v.* West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664, the following language:

'We do not say that within the limits from which it is not excluded by the amendment a state may not prescribe the qualification of its jurors, and in so doing make discriminations. It may confine the selection to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational qualifications. We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment [Constitution U. S.] was ever intended to prohibit this. Looking at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose. Its aim was against discrimination, because of race or color.'

"We have reached the conclusion that we cannot with any fair

construction of language say that the provisions in our Constitution and laws that grand juries shall be composed of twelve men mean less than the plain words import. To hold that it also means that a grand jury may be composed partly of men and partly of women would necessarily imply that with the same logic, or want of logic, we could also hold that it might be composed of twelve women. We are not dealing, and cannot deal, with the expediency of the law, but must declare only what it is. The right or duty (whichever it may be deemed to serve on grand juries) cannot be confounded with the right to vote, and until in the wisdom of our people a change is made in the provision of the Constitution it is our duty to uphold it as written.

"In 1875 there was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States (Minor *v.* Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L. Ed. 627) the question whether the right of citizenship of women also conferred the right of suffrage. After a lengthy discussion, the court held that one did not necessarily involve the other, and the concluding words of Chief Justice Waite, as to withholding from women then the right to vote, is not inappropriate here incident to her nonservice on juries:

'We have given this case the careful consideration its importance demands. If the law is wrong, it ought to be changed; but the power for that is not with us. The arguments addressed to us bearing upon such a view of the subject may perhaps be sufficient to induce those having the power to make the alteration, but they ought not to be permitted to influence our judgment in determining the present rights of the parties now litigating before us. No argument as to woman's need of suffrage can be considered. We can only act upon her rights as they exist. It is not for us to look at the hardship of withholding. Our duty is at an end if we find it is within the power of a state to withhold.' "

Virginia State Tax Held to Discriminate between National Bank Stock and Capital Invested in Competition Therewith.—In Merchants' Nat'l Bank of Richmond *v.* City of Richmond, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619, the Supreme Court of the United States, reversing a decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, held that, a tax imposed pursuant to Acts Va. 1915, c. 85, and a city ordinance enacted under the authority thereof, which, in connection with the tax under Acts Va. 1915, c. 117, amounted to $1.75 on each $100 invested in bank stock, whether national or state, while the rate was only 95 cents on each $100 valuation of intangible property, including bonds, notes, and other evidences of indebtedness, is contrary to U. S. Rev. St., sec. 5219 (Comp. St., sec. 9784), providing that the state tax on national bank shares shall not exceed the tax levied on moneyed capital in hands of individual citizens, where it was clearly shown that the capital taxed at lower rate was in relatively material competition with the banks of the state.